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Evidence on Competitive Advantage and Superior Stock 
Market Performance 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article analyzes the value-relevance of industry-based and re-
source-based competitive advantage in a large sample of firms listed 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. We measure competitive advantage by a 
single variable and perform a new decomposition into its underlying 
sources. In 1986-2005, the industry-based and the resource-based 
competitive advantage explain more than 20% of abnormal stock 
market returns, accumulated over five years. The resource-based ad-
vantage is almost four times more important than the industry-based 
advantage. Differences in both the return and the risk capability of 
firms’ net assets relative to their industry peers are significant parts of 
the resource-based advantage, estimated at 60% and 40%, respective-
ly. 
 
Keywords: Competitive advantage, superior performance, value-relevance of per-
formance metrics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of whether firm performance is driven primarily by industry-specific or firm-
specific factors has been intensively debated in the strategic management literature. This lite-
rature is dominated by two models of competitive advantage; the industrial organization mod-
el and the resource-based model (see e.g. Barney, 2007). Most empirical studies rely on some 
sort of variance decomposition procedure to measure the effects of industry-specific and firm-
specific factors on the variability of firm performance. This article expands previous empirical 
strategic management research in several directions. We focus on performance in terms of 
abnormal stock market performance instead of plain stock market performance or accounting-
based firm performance. We measure competitive advantage by a single variable and intro-
duce a new and intuitive decomposition of this variable into an industry-based competitive 
advantage and a resource-based competitive advantage. The resource-based advantage is fur-
ther decomposed into a return and a risk difference. The importance of these three sources of 
competitive advantage is evaluated empirically by their ability to explain abnormal stock 
market performance over short and long periods. In this sense, we are inspired by value-based 
management and concerned with the value-relevance of competitive advantage for equity in-
vestors. 
According to the industrial organization model of competitive advantage, the industry in 
which a firm chooses to compete has a stronger influence on firm performance than the choic-
es managers make inside their own organization (Porter, 1980 and 1985). Performance is be-
lieved to be determined primarily by economy-wide and industry-specific factors, including 
the intensity of competition among the firms within an industry. The resource-based model of 
competitive advantage assumes that each firm is a collection of resources and capabilities. 
They provide the basis for the firm's competitive strategy and are the primary source of the 
firm's return (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991 and 2001). Thus, according to this model, dif-
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ferences in firms' performance across time are primarily due to unique resources and capabili-
ties rather than to the industry's structural characteristics. A resource-based competitive ad-
vantage could stem from both the corporate- and the single business-level within a firm. 
Based on empirical work, the debate on the relative importance of industry-specific ver-
sus firm-specific effects on firm performance goes back at least to the work of Schmalensee 
(1985). He finds that industry-specific effects are the dominant explanatory factors of varia-
tion in profitability, measured by return on assets, while firm-specific effects in terms of both 
corporate and business-level effects are small. Rumelt (1991), on the other hand, finds that 
firm-specific effects explain the largest portion of profitability, followed by much smaller 
industry-specific effects.1 His ratio of firm-specific to industry-specific effects is almost ten to 
one. Later research confirms Rumelt's finding, but at a somewhat smaller level (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997; McGahan 1999; Bowman and Helfat, 2001; Spanos and Lioukas, 2001; Hawa-
wini et al., 2003 and 2005; Villalonga 2004; McNamara et al., 2005; Tong and Reuer, 2006; 
Misangyi et al., 2006). The majority of empirical studies employ return on assets or other 
accounting-based profitability measures to represent firm performance. Overall, empirical 
studies give strong support to the conclusion that firm-specific effects dominate industry-
specific effects in explaining firm performance and that this result is not sensitive to type of 
performance metric. Thus, the empirical findings offer strong support to the importance of 
resource-based competitive advantage. Furthermore, industry-based effects also have a signif-
icant influence on firm performance, although their impact is smaller.  
Our study differs from previous studies in several ways. First, we focus on superior, or 
equivalently, abnormal stock market performance, and do not investigate stock market per-
formance per se (Spanos and Lioukas, 2001), superior accounting-based firm performance 
                                                 
1 Rumelt (1991) and most subsequent studies find that business-level effects account for most of the total firm-
specific effect on firm performance. Corporate effects are small. We are not distinguishing between corporate 
and business-level effects since our focus on consolidated accounting information and stock market valuation 
does not allow us to divide the sources of competitive advantage into business segments and a separate corporate 
headquarter function. 
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(Hawawini et al., 2003) or Tobin's q (McGahan, 1999 and Villalonga, 2004). By replacing 
accounting-based firm return by stock market return, the connection between main sources of 
competitive advantage and factors that create value for firm owners in the equity market may 
be examined more directly. This is in line with the increased awareness on investor value cre-
ation through the growth of value-based management (see e.g. Haspeslagh et al., 2001; Young 
and O'Byrne, 2001). 
Second, we introduce a technique for measuring industry-based and resource-based 
competitive advantage as single variables. In turn, the resource-based advantage is split into 
two components, acknowledging the distinction between resources as return generators and 
risk accumulators reflected in the cost of capital. Next, we regress the industry-specific effect 
and the two firm-specific effects on abnormal stock market return to learn what is the impact 
of competitive advantage and its underlying components, when we simultaneously control for 
conventional risk factors. Our two sources of competitive advantage are: i) A firm is said to 
have an industry-based competitive advantage if its industry on average is able to earn a re-
turn on equity capital that is larger than the average cost of equity capital determined by the 
capital market. ii) A firm has a resource-based resource advantage if it is able to earn a return 
on its resources that is larger than the industry's average return or/and if the firm has a cost of 
equity capital below the industry's average cost of equity capital. The difference in return is 
related to net assets as strategic resources, while the difference in risk is related to funding 
abilities.  
Our sample consists of 3,051 firm-year observations over the twenty-year period 1986-
2005 of companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in Norway. We find that the industry-
based competitive advantage has a minor significant impact on the variability of superior 
stock market performance. On the other hand, the resource-based competitive advantage has a 
large impact, even after removing potentially extreme observations and checking for potential 
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instability and lack of robustness. The ratio of resource-based to industry-based competitive 
advantage is 3.7 when it is estimated over five-year periods and considerably higher when 
measured on an annual basis. Thus, our new approach confirms Rumelt's (1991) findings and 
the results of subsequent studies on the drivers of firm performance, and thus strongly sup-
ports the resource-based model of competitive advantage. Furthermore, we find that the re-
source-advantage is driven both by unique return and risk capabilities of the firms' net assets 
relative to the average of their industry peers. We estimate the importance of these two parts 
of the resource-based advantage at 61% and 39%, respectively.  
Our article is organized as follows. First, we develop our hypotheses and outline the test 
methodology. Second, we present the data, select the sample and give some descriptive statis-
tics. Third, we present our correlation and regression results, and analyze their implications, 
including tests for time stability and specification robustness. Finally, we give some conclud-
ing remarks. 
 
HYPOTHESES AND TEST METHODOLOGY 
A competitive advantage results in superior value creation for the firm and for its sharehold-
ers. Since superior value creation may be measured by the firm's ability to deliver a return on 
capital that exceeds its cost of capital, the outcome from a competitive advantage may be cal-
culated by the margin 
 
 CA = i - k, (1) 
 
where i is the internal rate of return on invested capital and k is the corresponding cost of cap-
ital, i.e. the risk-adjusted required rate of return on invested capital determined by the capital 
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market.2 Using this approach, a firm has a competitive or strategic advantage when it is able 
to earn a return on capital greater than the risk-adjusted required cost of capital (value crea-
tion). A firm has a competitive disadvantage when i is less than k (value destruction). If i 
equals k, the firm earns its 'equilibrium rate of return' (value conservation). This definition of 
competitive advantage is much in line with the definition used in standard textbooks, for in-
stance Barney (2007, pp. 17-19). Competitive Advantage is also closely related to perfor-
mance measures such as residual income, and thereby to Stern Stewart & Co's Economic Val-
ue Added (EVA); see e.g. Young and O'Byrne (2001). While these measures focus on the 
amount of money, our measure is the percentage return above the cost of capital. Competitive 
advantage may also be aggregated over several periods t = 1, ..., T, such that a sustainable 
advantage over T periods may be represented by (1 + CA1) · (1 + CA2) · ... · (1 + CAT) - 1, 
or, by using logarithmic abnormal returns, by t CAt.3 
To evaluate the sources of a firm's competitive advantage, CA, we utilize the following 
decomposition of (1): 
 
                                                 
2 A very simple example illustrates the difference between firm performance and stock market performance; 
compare (1) with (3): A firm invests 100 in year 0 and expects a cash flow of 70 in year 1 and 60 in year 2. The 
internal rate of return i is found by: -100 + 70/(1+i) + 60/(1+i)2 = 0, yielding an annual firm performance i = 
20%. If the risk-adjusted cost of capital k = 8%, the competitive advantage, CA, is 12%. A competitive advan-
tage of 12% implies that the firm is expected to have an abnormal performance of 12% each year, or accumu-
lated 25.4% over year 1 and 2. It does not imply that shareholders are expected to acquire an abnormal stock 
market return of 12% in each of these years. If the stock market efficiently incorporates all information, there 
will be no abnormal stock market return in year 1 and 2, the stock market value will increase immediately from 
100 to 116.3 at time 0 and thus yield an expected return of 8% in year 1 and 2; aggregated 16.6%. This example 
also illustrates that there is an important difference between calculated firm performance and observed stock 
market performance, due to the timing of income. Firm performance is typically recorded at a later period than 
stock market performance, responding immediately to news about e.g. new investment projects. 
3 A well-established research area in strategic management is to evaluate the time series properties of abnormal 
firm return (1), i.e. its sustainability (Connolly and Schwartz, 1985; Jacobsen, 1988; Penman, 1991; McGahan 
and Porter, 1999; Bou and Satorra, 2007). However, in these studies abnormal return is usually measured as the 
firm's accounting return minus the average accounting return of all firms in a particular period; see Jacobsen 
(1988) for an adjustment involving accounting beta. The main finding is that abnormal return converges toward 
zero, i.e. that firm performance is mean reverting. But the convergence process does not lead to zero abnormal 
return in the long run, consistent with the existence of sustainable competitive advantage for some firms. 
 - 6 - 
 
  

RB
RBRBIB
CA
Advantage eCompetitiv
Based-Resource
RID
Difference
Risk
I
RED
Difference
Return
I
CA
Advantage, eCompetitiv
Based-Industry
II k   -   k              i   -   i        k   -   i  CA    (2) 
 
where iI is the industry's average internal rate of return on equity and kI is its average equity 
cost of capital. The first part, CAIB = iI - kI, is the industry-based competitive advantage. 
When the whole industry on average is able to earn a return, iI, greater than its average cost of 
capital, kI, it has a competitive advantage, e.g. due to entry barriers leading to imperfect com-
petition. The second part, CARB is the resource-based competitive advantage, which is the part 
of CA not related to industry (i.e. the residual). 
CARB is split into two components. The first one, REDRB = i - iI, represents the return 
difference between firm and industry caused by the firm's assets or resources. When a firm is 
able to generate a return, i, greater than the average return in its industry, iI, this firm has a 
return advantage over an average firm. This component may stem from some resource or ca-
pability belonging to this firm alone, or, at least, it may have a larger quantity or quality of 
such assets than does an average firm, e.g. superior technology or competence to employ hu-
man resources more effectively than its competitors. The second component, RIDRB = kI - k, 
emphasizes that a valuable strategic resource may stem from financial funding through the 
market-based risk premium relative to an average firm. We may regard this as a risk-based 
advantage caused by the risk built into the firm's resources, since risk in general accounts for 
the difference between the two costs of capital.  
 It is necessary to take both components, REDRB and RIDRB, into consideration when 
computing the resource-based competitive advantage, CARB. Generally, return and risk are 
not separable. A return difference may be positive simply because the firm has more risky 
assets than the average industry or higher leverage, which in turn would imply that the risk 
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difference becomes negative. The two effects may outbalance each other and will in that case 
show up in a high negative correlation between the variables (Modigliani-Miller's irrelevance 
theorem of capital structure and hence financial risk; see e.g. Berk and DeMarzo, 2006). Thus, 
a low correlation between the return and the risk difference will be required to make our de-
composition of the resource-based competitive advantage meaningful with respect to separate 
return and risk advantages.4 
(1) and (2) are intuitive and quite powerful quantitative measures of the proceeds of 
having a competitive advantage, which may stem from a number of underlying factors.5 For 
example, the industry-based competitive advantage is likely to be influenced by structural 
factors in that industry, while the resource-based competitive advantage would be influenced 
by management skills and other capabilities of the firm. A supplementary approach to under-
standing each source of competitive advantage is thus to regress abnormal returns on various 
underlying explanatory factors (see the conclusion for future research proposals). 
In line with the growing importance of value-based management, we evaluate how su-
perior stock market return is affected by our measure of competitive advantage (1). Conse-
quently, we estimate the following regression model: 
 
 AR =  +  · CA + , (3) 
 
                                                 
4 Our data suggest that the correlation between the return and risk difference is only -0.066 when accumulated 
over five years; see Panel C of Table 3. This implies that the collinearity between the return and the risk differ-
ence is statistically significant, but low in magnitude. This makes our decomposition of the resource-based com-
petitive advantage meaningful. 
5 If the firm is operating in multiple industries, (2) could in principle be specified in accordance with each indus-
try, business unit or segment, including the corporate headquarter supplying joint services to all units. The cumu-
lative competitive advantage of a firm would then be the sum of its competitive advantages in each segment plus 
the additional competitive advantage of being organized as a single corporation. This expansion of (2) may be 
utilized to study the effect of business-level versus corporate-level strategy, which is in accordance with the 
empirical studies on the drivers of firm performance in the previous section. If this distinction is less important, 
the firm's average i and k may be utilized to capture an aggregate firm-effect, i.e. the sum of the business-level 
and the corporate-level effect. 
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where AR is abnormal stock market return,  and  are the associated regression coefficients, 
CA is the competitive advantage given by (1), and  is the error term.6,7 Competitive advan-
tage is relevant in explaining abnormal stock market performance, or simply value-relevant, if 
the response coefficient , or the R2, is different from zero at the desired level of statistical 
significance. 
The abnormal stock market return of a firm, AR, equals r - k, i.e. the difference between 
the observed stock market return, r, and the expected stock market return, k, conditioned on 
conventional risk factors like systematic risk (Capital Asset Pricing Model) and on proxy risk 
factors like firm size and the book-to-price ratio (Fama and French, 1992 and 1993). The ex-
pected stock market return, k, is not observable and has to be estimated on the basis of stock 
market data, for example by employing the market model on the time series of returns and 
adjusting for size and book-to-price effects on the cross-section of firms (see e.g. Berk and 
DeMarzo, 2006). 
Furthermore, the value-relevance of the three sources of competitive advantage in (2) 
may be tested by running the regression: 
 
 AR =  + 1 · CAIB + 2 · REDRB + 3 · RIDRB + , (4) 
 
                                                 
6 Regression (3) may be accused of being in some sense tautological since superior performance is regressed on 
superior performance. However, the left hand side is superior stock market performance and the right hand side 
includes superior firm performance as the outcome of having a competitive advantage. In this way, (3) only tests 
whether a firm with superior firm performance, or a competitive advantage according to our definition (1), also 
generates superior stock market performance. This is not more tautological than explaining stock return by ac-
counting return; see e.g. Easton and Harris (1991). The fact that we do not obtain results with unreasonably high 
R2-values, also indicates sound models in this respect; see Table 4. 
7 An examination of the value-relevance of competitive advantage, specified by regression (3), is closely related 
to the literature testing the value-relevance of various performance metrics, such as firm return or abnormal firm 
return. Easton and Harris (1991), and most of the literature on the value-relevance of accounting information, 
demonstrate that accounting earnings and changes in such earnings, deflated by the stock price, are highly rele-
vant for explaining abnormal stock market return. In large samples, the accounting return on market-based equity 
typically explains about 8-10% of abnormal stock market return, measured on an annual basis. Deflated abnor-
mal earnings in terms of Stern Stewart & Co's Economic Value Added (EVA), have been found to explain about 
5-6% of abnormal stock market return (Biddle et al., 1997), questioning whether EVA is superior to earnings as 
a performance metric. This and most succeeding studies are consistent with the hypothesis that the competitive 
advantage of a firm is highly relevant for explaining its abnormal stock market performance. 
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where CAIB is the industry-based competitive advantage, while REDRB and RIDRB are the 
firm-specific return and the risk difference, as specified in (2).8 If 1 is significantly different 
from zero, the industry-based competitive advantage is value-relevant; if 2 is significant, the 
return difference is value-relevant; and if 3 is significant, the risk difference is value-
relevant. Finally, if 2 + 3 is significantly different from zero, the resource-based competitive 
advantage is value-relevant. Since REDRB is expected to be negatively correlated with RIDRB, 
the estimation of 2 and 3 may be biased due to collinearity. However, neither the estimation 
of 2 + 3 nor the evaluation of the relative importance of industry versus resources will be 
affected. 
The relative importance of the three sources CAIB, REDRB and RIDRB may be calculated 
in several ways. One approach is to focus on the estimated coefficients and compute 1/(1 + 
2 + 3), 2/(1 + 2 + 3) and 3/(1 + 2 + 3), respectively; i.e. the relative effect in abnormal 
stock market return of a change of one percentage point in each of the associated variables.9 
The ratio of resource-based to industry-based competitive advantage may then be defined as 
(2 + 3)/1.10 An alternative procedure is to measure the contribution of each source of com-
petitive advantage by the marginal increase in explained variance, represented by adjusted R2, 
by loading all three sources of competitive advantages in (4) relative to a corresponding re-
gression with only two of them included. 
                                                 
8 The nature of stock market data implies that they do not provide information at the business-level, since stock 
market returns on separate business units are usually not observable; they include only the aggregated return for 
the listed company as a single unit. This implies that in practice, (3) and (4) may be run only at the corporate-
level, making the approach inappropriate for testing business-level effects. 
9 Notice that all variables in (4) have the same unit of measurement; abnormal percentage return, either market-
based or firm-based. This suggests that the coefficients may be used as measures of the relative impact of CAIB, 
REDRB and RIDRB, respectively. 
10 Similar to the variance decomposition approach of Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991), a different way is 
to specify a three-way crossed random effects model: AR =  + CAIB + REDRB + RIDRB + . If the three sources 
of competitive advantage are independent, the variance of abnormal stock market return AR2 = IB2 + RED2 + 
RID2 + 2. The importance of resources relative to industry may then be measured by the ratio (RED2 + 
RID2)/IB2. As a robustness check, this variance-based ratio should be reported in addition to the coefficient-
based counterpart for key empirical findings. A problem with the variance decomposition approach is the as-
sumption of strict independence among the sources of competitive advantage (Misangyi et al., 2006). 
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The abnormal stock market return regression (3) and (4) may be specified for different 
time periods. If competitive advantage and abnormal stock market return are measured by 
logarithms on an annual basis, (3) may be expanded over time simply by making year-by-year 
accumulations, t AR =  + · t CA + . Similarly, (4) may be expanded to t AR =  + 1 · 
t CAIB + 2 · t REDRB + 3 · t RIDRB + . The value-relevance of CA and its three sources, 
CAIB, REDRB and RIDRB, may therefore be examined over longer periods like five or ten 
years.11 
To sum up, our alternative hypotheses (to their nulls) may be specified as 
1) Competitive advantage is a relevant factor in explaining abnormal stock market perfor-
mance. 
2) Industry-based competitive advantage, the return difference and the risk difference, and 
hence the resource-based competitive advantage, are all relevant factors in explaining 
abnormal stock market performance. 
3) The importance of the industry-based competitive advantage differs from the impor-
tance of resource-based competitive advantages, i.e. the ratio of profitability-based to 
risk-based competitive advantage, (2 + 3)/1, is different from 1. 
Observations of superior stock market returns and sources of competitive advantage are 
usually panel or longitudinal data, with cross-sectional observations over time. The appropri-
ate regression models (3) and (4) should therefore allow for unobserved effects in terms of 
fixed, random or mixed effects across time, industries and firms (Greene, 2007; Wooldridge, 
2002). However, if pooled OLS regressions are chosen because they yield similar findings, 
                                                 
11 McGahan and Porter (1999) find that changes in industry structure have a relatively more persistent impact on 
abnormal firm performance than changes in firm structure, even though firm effects are larger than industry 
effects; see also Bou and Satorra (2007). By utilizing (4) conditioned on a sustainable competitive advantage, 
one may explore whether a persistent industry-based advantage generates a relatively higher abnormal stock 
market performance than a short-run industry-based advantage, and whether a resource-based advantage would 
be less persistent in terms of value-relevance. 
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their results should be accompanied by robust standard deviations and followed by a discus-
sion on how unobserved effects influence on the results.12  
 
DATA, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In order to test the hypothesis whether competitive advantage and its underlying components 
are relevant factors in explaining superior stock market performance, a large sample of data 
on firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) is employed. Over the twenty years 1986-
2005, we have access to 3,284 firm-year observations from 511 individual firms.13 For each 
observation we have accounting-based return on equity, stock market return and estimates of 
market-based cost of equity capital. Since we have no data dividing accounting return, stock 
market return and required return into different business segments within firms, all firms are 
by assumption considered to operate within one industry group. This implies that we are not 
able to calculate competitive advantages at the business-level. We only compare the firm-, or 
corporate-level, with the industry-level, as suggested by (2). 
If financial statements are recorded according to the historical cost principle, the ac-
counting return on equity will be an estimate of the underlying internal rate of return on equi-
ty with noise due to measurement errors. If financial statements are recorded at fair value, the 
equity return will be a noisy estimate of the required rate of return on equity or the internal 
rate of return in alternative use. Therefore, using the accounting rate of return as a proxy for 
the internal rate of return of each firm's equity capital is only valid when the financial state-
ments are recorded according to transactional cost or when transactional cost is the dominant 
principle of book-keeping, which implies that a Norwegian sample is eminently suitable for 
                                                 
12 An additional argument for not focusing primarily on unobserved effects models is that they are less robust 
with respect to specification errors, e.g. specifications errors related to whether the effects are fixed or random. 
13 For the period 1993-2005, our data contains almost all firms listed on the OSE. For the period 1986-1992, 
some firms are missing, mostly smaller firms. The market returns are collected from the Stock Market Data Base 
at NHH, while the accounting data is collected from the annual financial statements, Kierulf's Handbook of Cor-
porate Information and Datastream. 
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our purpose. Over the years 1986-2004, most firms listed on the OSE used Norwegian Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Principles, NGAAP, as the basis for preparing their financial 
statements, while some used USGAAP or other accounting standards. The main principle of 
NGAAP is transaction-based historical cost, with fair value for liquid financial instruments in 
recent years. From 2005, firms listed on European exchanges were required by the European 
Union to report consolidated financial statements according to the International Financial Re-
porting Standards, IFRS, in which measurement according to fair value is more prominent 
than according to NGAAP. Nevertheless, cost is the alternative basis for measurement accord-
ing to IFRS when fair value cannot be measured reliably. In practice, cost is used for nearly 
all assets other than liquid financial instruments, as their fair values are hard to measure relia-
bly.14 This suggests that the accounting rate of return on equity may function as a noisy meas-
ure of the internal rate of return on equity, which is required to compute competitive advan-
tage in (1). 
The annual accounting return on equity (our proxy for i) is simply the recorded earnings 
in a given year divided by the previous year's book-value of equity. If this book-value is nega-
tive, no meaningful return may be calculated and consequently, the observation is dropped. 
The required return on equity, k, i.e. the market-based risk-adjusted cost of equity, is esti-
mated on the basis of annual stock market data. The firms' annual stock returns, including 
dividends and measured by logarithms, are divided into 10 size portfolios. Size is measured 
by the logarithm of the stock market value. Abnormal returns for each year are calculated as 
the realized annual stock return, r, minus the average annual stock return in the corresponding 
size portfolio (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). In addition, we adjust for another well documented 
proxy risk factor, the book-to-price ratio (Fama and French, 1992 and 1993). We run a cross-
sectional regression each year, where the size-adjusted abnormal stock returns are explained 
                                                 
14 In a sample of firms reporting financial statements according to IFRS, Christensen and Nikolaev (2009) find 
no companies using fair value accounting for intangible assets and only 3% using fair value accounting for prop-
erty, plant and equipment. 
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by the book-to-price ratio. The excess return after this adjustment is our measure of abnormal 
return, AR = r - k.15 A firm's competitive advantage for a given year equals its accounting 
return on equity minus its required return on equity, CA = i - k, and is split into its three un-
derlying sources according to (2). 
The 511 firms are divided into 11 industries according to the official OSE classification 
for most of the period 1986-2005. These industries are property (17 firms; 103 firm-year ob-
servations), banking and insurance (42; 245), retailing (17; 112), manufacturing (157; 994), 
information technology and communications (93; 449), media (10; 87), offshore (47; 247), 
shipping (78; 534), other transportation (13; 109), others services (28; 184) and savings banks 
(23; 220) issuing primary capital certificates.16, 17, 18 The average return on equity and the av-
erage cost of equity are calculated for each of these industries. In accordance with (2), the 
industry-based competitive advantage is the average return on equity in an industry for a giv-
en measurement period minus the average equity cost of capital in that industry for that pe-
riod. The resource-based competitive advantage is the firm's return on equity for a given pe-
riod minus the average return on equity in that firm's industry for that period plus the average 
equity cost of capital in a firm's industry for a given period minus the firm's own equity cost 
of capital for that period. 
Initially, we had 3,284 observations available for the annual abnormal stock return vari-
able, AR, and for the competitive advantage variable, CA, which in turn was split into its 
                                                 
15 Since we are able to adjust for possible effects of systematic (beta) risk for only the last ten years of our sam-
ple period, we shall take the opportunity to learn whether our initial results are robust against such a change in 
abnormal return calculations; see Table 10. 
16 The number of firms over industries is 525, larger than 511, because 14 firms have changed industry over time 
and are therefore counted twice when splitting the number of firms according to industry. 
17 We also perform a robustness test where we use the revised industry classification (the Global Industry Classi-
fication Standard developed by Morgan Stanley and Standard and Poor's), in which the number of industry 
groups is increased from 11 to 23; see Table 11. As for systematic risk, we are only able to investigate the possi-
ble effects of this change over the last ten years of our sample period, since the new classification system was 
introduced on OSE in January 1995. 
18 Other studies using market-based measures of performance, e.g. Hawawini et al. (2003), also contain a small 
number of industry groups relative to studies using accounting-based measures of performance; see Table 1 in 
Bowman and Helfat (2001). Hawawini et al. include 5,620 observations for 562 firms across 55 industry classi-
fications. Due to a more homogeneous industry structure in Norway, the listed OSE firms are categorized into 23 
industries. 
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three underlying components, CAIB, REDRB and RIDRB. In order to reduce the possible impact 
of extreme observations, i.e. strategic leaders and losers, the full sample has been reduced by 
removing the 1% upper and the 1% lower observations in each of the four competitive advan-
tage variables on an annual basis.19 Table 1 shows that the selected sample includes 3,051 
firm-year observations, a reduction of 7.1% ( 4 variables · 2 tails · 1%, due to the removal of 
overlapping observations). 504 individual firms are represented. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics when the competitive advantage and abnormal 
stock market return are measured on an annual basis. The mean abnormal return for the se-
lected sample is 1.2%. Since the average abnormal return for all observations on the OSE over 
the period by construction equals zero, the firms excluded from the sample, either because of 
lacking accounting data or because they are extreme firm-year observations, typically produce 
negative abnormal returns. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE - 
 
We learn that the mean competitive advantage is 4.0% in the selected sample of 3,051 
firm-year observations, implying that firms on average earn an accounting return on equity 
four percentage points above their estimated cost of capital. This represents the industry-based 
competitive advantage, since the average resource-based advantage by construction must be 
approximately zero. As we shall see, this does not necessarily imply that the industry-based 
                                                 
19 All removed observations will be utilized later in a robustness test; see McNamara et al. (2005) and Table 12. 
In order to further investigate the impact of extreme observations, Table 13 presents the results from running 
robust regressions in which extreme observations from a statistical point of view are given less weights. 
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competitive advantage dominates the resource-based one in explaining superior stock market 
performance. 
 
TEST RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
To test whether abnormal stock market performance is related to competitive advantage and 
its underlying drivers, we analyze binary correlation coefficients and perform multiple ordi-
nary least square regressions in Stata. Our regression results will be tested for time stability 
and robustness against alternative specifications, including unobserved firm, industry and 
time effects. 
 
Binary Correlation 
Table 3 reports the binary correlation coefficients between competitive advantage and its un-
derlying sources, measured over one, three and five years. According to Panel A, containing 
the one-year measures, the correlation between CA and CAIB is 0.724. This implies that the 
industry-based competitive advantage explains 52.4% (= 0.7242) of the variation in CA. The 
correlation between CA and REDRB is 0.543, i.e. the return difference explains 29.5% of the 
variation in CA. Finally, the correlation between CA and RIDRB is 0.295, i.e. the risk differ-
ence explains 8.7% of the variation in CA. We may therefore conclude that the industry-based 
competitive advantage is about 40% more important than the resource-based competitive ad-
vantage (the ratio CARB/CAIB is 0.7). If the period of accumulating performance is expanded 
to three or five years, the two resource-based competitive advantages typically become more 
important; see Panel B and C of Table 3. Based on five years of measurement, the industry-
based advantage explains about 70% less than the resource-based advantage, suggesting a 
ratio of resources-to-industry of about 3.5. 
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- INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Furthermore, CAIB is significantly negatively correlated with both REDRB and RIDRB, 
irrespective of which measurement length is chosen. Firms with a large industry-based com-
petitive advantage typically have both a significantly lower return difference (and vice versa) 
and a significantly lower risk difference (and vice versa). REDRB is significantly positively 
correlated with RIDRB for one-year and significantly negatively correlated for three- and five-
year measures.20 From the discussion following (2), these correlations are very interesting. An 
average correlation coefficient close to zero justifies our decomposition of the resource-based 
competitive advantage into a return and a risk difference. Each factor contributes indepen-
dently to estimating the effects of extraordinary returns and funding abilities. 
According to Panel A, the correlation between abnormal return and competitive advan-
tage is 0.219, i.e. competitive advantage explains 4.8% of the variation in abnormal stock re-
turns, measured over one year. Consequently, the corresponding regression model in Table 4 
produces an R2 of 4.8%. The current competitive advantage is value-relevant, leading to high-
er abnormal stock market return. This is consistent with the findings of Biddle et al. (1997), 
where Economic Value Added, EVA, deflated by the previous year stock price, explains 
about 5-6% of the variance in market-adjusted annual stock return. Expanding the measure-
ment horizon beyond one year increases the correlation between AR and CA; see Panel B and 
C of Table 3. With five years of accumulation, CA explains almost 25% of the variation in 
AR. 
The underlying sources of competitive advantage are not all value-relevant when accu-
mulating performance over only one year. According to Panel A, the correlation between ab-
normal stock market return and the industry-based competitive advantage, CAIB, is only 0.019 
                                                 
20 Low correlations between the 'independent' variables imply insignificant multicollinearity problems in the 
abnormal return regression given by (4). Thus, our approach is not affected by the criticism of lacking indepen-
dence, which affects studies analyzing variance components (Misangyi et al., 2006). 
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and not significantly different from zero. The correlation between AR and the risk difference, 
RIDRB, is also low (0.037), although significant at the 5%-level. Hence, for one-year of mea-
surement, CAIB and RIDRB are not very important in explaining AR. At longer horizons, both 
correlations increase and become highly significant; see Panel B and C. When measured over 
one year, the correlation between AR and the return difference is 0.311, i.e. REDRB explains 
9.7% of the variation in AR and is highly significant. The ability of REDRB to explain AR also 
increases with accumulation and reaches 20.1% for five-year of measurement. As the five-
year ratio of resources-to-industry is 19.5, we conclude that the return difference is definitely 
the most important factor explaining abnormal stock market performance. We expect to find 
support for this result also from the multiple regression analysis (4), in which the underlying 
sources of competitive advantage are accounted for simultaneously as separate variables. 
 
Multiple Regressions – Pooled OLS 
The results from running a multiple regression with abnormal stock market return measured 
over one year and the underlying sources of competitive advantage for that year as indepen-
dent variables are reported in Table 4. Later, we shall control the pooled OLS results for un-
observed fixed and random effects. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE - 
 
All three sources of competitive advantage have a positive response coefficient, mean-
ing that they contribute positively to abnormal stock market return; see (4).21 The combined 
value-relevance of them, as measured by the adjusted R2, is 10.1%, which is significant at the 
1%-level. The two response coefficients measuring the impact of the resource-based competi-
                                                 
21 The variance inflation factors are 1.01 for CAIB, 1.01 for REDRB and 1.00 for RIDRB, suggesting that there is 
no problem caused by multicollinearity in (4); see also Table 3 for an overview of the correlation coefficients 
between variables. 
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tive advantage are highly significant, while the coefficient representing the industry-based 
competitive advantage is not significant.22 The relative contribution of each component is 
estimated at 6.4% [= 0.062/(0.062 + 0.680 + 0.229)] for the industry-based, 70.0% for the 
return difference and 23.6% for the risk difference.23 Thus, the ratio of resources-to-industry 
is 14.6 [= (0.680 + 0.229)/0.062]; see Table 6 for the results when measuring performance 
and competitive advantage over periods of two up to ten years. This ratio is significantly dif-
ferent from one. 
In a semi-strong efficient stock market, prices immediately reflect all publicly available 
information. However, to capture the potential effect of a delayed incorporation of informa-
tion about the competitive positioning of firms into their stock market value, we expand the 
time period over which abnormal stock market performance is measured relative to the period 
over which competitive advantage is measured. We shall therefore investigate abnormal stock 
market return the following year as well as the cumulative effect, i.e. examine abnormal re-
turn for a two-year period, relative to the one-year period of measuring competitive advan-
tage.24 
To test the predictability of the one-year competitive advantage and its underlying 
sources for future abnormal return, we perform regressions with next year's abnormal return 
as the dependent variable. Table 5, Panel A, reports the results. The number of observations 
decreases at 2,747 due to lacking data on next year's abnormal returns. 
                                                 
22 When testing for the statistical significance of the regression coefficients, we utilize standard deviations ad-
justed for possible heteroskedasticity; see White (1980). As the sample size is large, we utilize the HC1-
estimator; see MacKinnon and White (1985). 
23 Measured by the marginal increase in adjusted R2, the importance of the three sources of competitive advan-
tage is 0.1% for the industry-based advantage, 10.0% for the return difference and 0.4% for the risk difference. 
The ratio of resources-to-industry is 104.0. Alternatively, the variance of abnormal stock market return could be 
decomposed into its sources by assuming a three-way crossed random effects model: IB2 = 0.003, RED2 = 0.458, 
RID2 = 0.048 and 2 = 0.254; see footnote 10. The variance-based ratio of resources-to-industry is (0.458 + 
0.048)/0.003 = 172.2. The variances could be estimated by the xtmixed - command in Stata, employing the struc-
ture: xtmixed AR || _all: CAIB, noconstant || _all: REDRB, noconstant || _all: RIDRB, noconstant variance; see 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005). 
24 Alternatively, the current year's abnormal return ARt could be expanded to capture predictability by computing 
ARt · (1 + ARt+1) instead of ARt + ARt+1. Both variables may be regarded as inefficiency-adjusted versions of 
ARt; see Aboody et al. (2002). 
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- INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE - 
 
The competitive advantage measured over one year is relevant for predicting next year's 
abnormal stock market return, which indicates a delay in the incorporation of information 
about the competitive advantage into stock prices. Although the regression coefficient is high-
ly significant, the adjusted R2 is only 0.6%. Looking at the underlying sources of competitive 
advantage, R2 increases to 2.7%. The only significant coefficient is the one associated with 
the return difference. This suggests that buying stocks in firms with unique net assets produc-
ing an above average return in one year, leads to a statistically significant abnormal return 
also in the following year, although it might be difficult to exploit this relationship to obtain 
an extraordinary profit due to transactions costs and other sources of frictions in the stock 
market. We learn that the return difference is the most important factor also for prediction 
purposes. 
The abnormal stock market return accumulated over two years is the basis for our next 
test of value-relevance. Table 5, Panel B, reports the findings. The estimated one-year com-
petitive advantage is able to explain 4.3% of the variation in the estimated cumulative abnor-
mal stock market return over two years. The adjusted R2 and the regression coefficient are 
both highly significant. Within this broader, but still relatively short timeframe, the measured 
competitive advantage is again relevant for creating superior or abnormal stock market return. 
Splitting the one-year competitive advantage into its three underlying sources yields an ad-
justed R2 of 11.0%. The only significant regression coefficient is the one for the return differ-
ence.25 The contribution of each component is estimated at 4.7%, 82.2% and 13.1% for CAIB, 
                                                 
25 Panel C of Table 5 reveals, somewhat tautologically, that the reason why the profitability-based competitive 
advantage is the most significant factor explaining stock market performance stems from the fact that the return 
on equity, i, is clearly the most important factor explaining abnormal stock market return. Evaluated individual-
ly, the other factors, k, iI and kI, are not significant. 
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REDRB and RIDRB, respectively. This produces a large ratio of resource-based to industry-
based competitive advantage equal to 20.3.26 Hence, the resource-based competitive advan-
tage, and especially the return difference, seems to be the most essential factor for creating 
abnormal stock market performance over the current and the following year. 
Table 6 reports the results of measuring competitive advantage and abnormal stock 
market performance beyond single years. The abnormal stock market performance is accumu-
lated one year longer than the competitive advantage to capture a possible delayed incorpora-
tion of information into stock prices. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Panel A reports the accumulation of competitive advantage and abnormal stock market 
performance over 1-5 years, while Panel B reports the accumulation over 6-10 years. The 
competitive advantage is estimated to be significant for all measurement horizons and both 
the response coefficient and R2 tend to increase with the number of years accumulated. Fur-
thermore, the industry-based competitive advantage increases in importance with the length of 
the horizon, as its coefficient increases from 0.063 to 0.306 and 0.365 with 5 and 10 years of 
accumulation, respectively. The return difference decreases from 1.101 to 0.690 and 0.613 
with 5 and 10 years of accumulation, respectively, while the risk difference increases from 
0.175 to 0.438 and 0.768 with 5 and 10 years of accumulation, respectively. Including more 
than three years, all three sources are highly significant, suggesting that both industry-specific 
and firm-specific factors are important for superior stock market performance. 
                                                 
26 The marginal increase in adjusted R2 for the one-year horizon is: Industry-based advantage 0.1%, return dif-
ference 11.1% and risk difference 0.1%. Hence, the ratio of resource-based to industry-based strategic advantage 
is 112.0, suggesting that industry effects are not significant when measured over short-term periods. Alternative-
ly, the variance of abnormal return could be decomposed into its sources by assuming a three-way crossed ran-
dom effects model: IB2 = 0.002, RED2 = 1.197, RID2 = 0.020 and 2 = 0.590. The variance-based ratio of re-
sources-to-industry thus becomes (1.197 + 0.020)/0.002 = 751.1. 
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Using a five-year horizon, the industry component constitutes 23.1%, the return differ-
ence 48.1% and the risk difference 30.6% of the total. Thus, the resource-based competitive 
advantage accounts for 78.7%, providing a ratio of resource-based to industry-based competi-
tive advantage of 3.7, i.e. much below the ratio of 20.3 from only one year of accumulation.27 
Hence, the importance of the resource-based component decreases, while the importance of 
the industry-based component increases with the number of years. With ten years, the ratio of 
resources-to-industry is 3.8, suggesting that the ratio 'stabilizes' around 3-4; the ratios being 
highly significantly different from one for all years of accumulations. As the number of years 
increases, the return component of the resource-based competitive advantage loses, while the 
risk component gains in importance. Accumulated over five years, the return component ac-
counts for 61.2% of the resource-based advantage. 
McGahan and Porter (1999) find that changes in industry structure have a relatively 
more persistent impact on abnormal firm performance than changes in firm structure, even 
though firm effects are larger than industry effects; see also Bou and Satorra (2007). This 
finding is confirmed by our result indicating that the relative importance of industry structure 
for creating superior stock market performance increases with the duration of the competitive 
advantage. 
Table 7 splits the sample into firms having a competitive advantage and a competitive 
disadvantage; see (1). 
 
- INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE - 
 
                                                 
27 The marginal increase in adjusted R2 for the five-year horizon is: Industry-based competitive advantage 2.0%, 
return difference 21.5% and risk difference 2.2%. Hence, the ratio of the resource-based to industry-based com-
petitive advantage is 11.8. Alternatively, the variance of abnormal return could be decomposed into its sources: 
IB2 = 0.091, RED2 = 0.474, RID2 = 0.187 and 2 = 1.217. The variance-based ratio of resources-to-industry is 
thus (0.474 + 0.187)/0.091 = 7.2. 
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Both competitive advantage and disadvantage are highly relevant drivers of superior 
stock market return. On average, competitive advantage leads to positive abnormal stock 
market returns, while competitive disadvantage has the opposite effect. For value-creators in 
Panel A, the resources-to-industry ratio is 3.8, and for value-destroyers in Panel B, the re-
source-to-industry ratio is 3.9, when performance is accumulated over five years, i.e. no sig-
nificant difference between the two with respect to the value-relevance of resource-based rela-
tive to industry-based competitive advantage.28 On the other hand, since the adjusted R2 is 
measured 7.0 percentage points higher for value-destroyers than for value-creators, a five-year 
measure of competitive advantage is more value-relevant for destroyers than for creators. 
Having a competitive disadvantage suggests that it is more likely that the future is limited 
because of a higher risk of going bankrupt, making the correlation between superior stock 
market performance and short- and medium-term measure of competitive position higher. 
Our finding that the resource-based competitive advantages are about 3-4 times more 
important than the industry-based competitive advantage when explaining superior stock 
market performance, is in line with the results of Rumelt (1991) and subsequent studies 
(McGahan and Porter, 1997; Hawawini et al., 2003). Those studies document that the firm-
specific effect on average is about three times more important than the industry-specific ef-
fect.29 Focusing on abnormal firm performance in terms of Economic Value Added, EVA, 
deflated by invested capital in the firm, Hawawini et al. (2003) calculate this ratio at about 
2.5. 
 
 
                                                 
28 For comparison, the variance-based ratio of resources-to-industry is 7.8 for value creators and 8.9 for value 
destroyers. 
29 This dominance of firm-specific effects over industry-specific effects is also confirmed in a study using a non-
parametric approach as a substitute for the usual variance decomposition methodology; see Ruefli and Wiggins 
(2003) and McGahan and Porter (2005). A similar effect is observed when taking into account the high inter-
dependence between the explanatory variables in these types of studies; see Misangyi et al. (2006). 
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Stability and Robustness Tests – Pooled OLS 
The stability of our results over time is tested by splitting the twenty-year period into two 
equal sub-periods. Furthermore, the latter ten years are divided into two five-year periods. 
Since we are able to calculate abnormal return adjusted for systematic risk only over the last 
ten years, our first robustness test is to examine possible effects of this change in measuring 
the required rate of return. In addition, we also investigate whether our results are robust 
against changing the industry specification from 11 to 23 industries, as well as against the 
possible impact of extreme observations. The robustness of the pooled OLS assumption will 
be analyzed in the next subsection. 
Table 8 presents the results from dividing our twenty-year period into the two equal 
sub-periods. We learn that competitive advantage is highly value-relevant in both of them. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE - 
 
When competitive advantage is measured over one year, the industry-based competitive 
advantage is significantly different from zero in the sub-period 1986-1995; see Panel A. In 
1996-2005, however, the impact of the industry-based advantage is not significant; see Panel 
B. We may speculate that industry-specific effects were more important in the first part of our 
sample period due to an increased focus on fair competition by the competition authorities in 
recent years. The risk difference is not significant in either sub-period. The return difference 
is highly significant in both sub-periods, but its impact increases substantially in the second 
one. This divergence between the two sub-periods also shows up in the highly significant 
change in adjusted R2 of 7.1 percentage points. Over five years, the three sources CAIB, 
REDRB and RIDRB are all also highly significant, although they obtain smaller values in the 
second than in the first sub-period. The ratio of resources-to-industry is 2.5 in 1986-1995 and 
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3.6 in 1996-2005.30 This is consistent with the reduced importance of the industry-based com-
petitive advantage measured on an annual basis. The difference in the ratio between the two 
sub-periods is highly significant. Consequently, the hypothesis of stability over time is re-
jected; see Table 8, Panel B. 
Table 9 presents the results from splitting the last ten years into two sub-periods of five 
years. As shown in Panel A and B, we see that competitive advantage, CA, is highly relevant 
for superior stock market performance in both sub-periods, irrespective of the length over 
which it has been measured. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Once more, the return difference is significant, while the risk difference and the indus-
try-based competitive advantage are not significant in either five-year period when accumulat-
ing performance over only one year. In this case, Panel A and B do not differ significantly, as 
the difference in adjusted R2 is only 0.1 percentage points. When evaluated over five years, 
however, we observe a significant difference in adjusted R2 of 8.5 percentage points. All 
sources of competitive advantage become more important in the second period, the industry-
based component less than the resource-based components, which implies a significant de-
crease in the ratio of resources-to-industry from 3.5 in 1996-2000 to 3.2 in 2001-2005.31 
Our first robustness test is to analyze whether the lacking adjustment for systematic risk 
in the required rate of equity return affects our findings; see the discussion in the previous 
section. Over the last ten years, we are able to compute a required rate of equity return taking 
into consideration systematic risk, represented by the market risk parameter beta estimated for 
                                                 
30 The variance-based ratio of resources-to-industry is 3.1 in 1986-1995 and 7.7 in 1996-2005. Thus, the increase 
in the importance of resources is also found when using a variance decomposition approach similar to Schmalen-
see (1995) and Rumelt (1991). 
31 In comparison, the variance-based ratio is 12.4 in 1996-2000 and 5.2 in 2001-2005. Again this approach yields 
similar results as the coefficient-based ratio. 
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each firm on the basis of the market model (employed on the return time series over the 36 
months before the end of the year), as well as the previously employed proxy risk factors of 
firm size and book-to-price ratio. Table 10 reports the results and they should be compared 
with those of Panel B of Table 8. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE - 
 
When focusing on competitive advantage over only one year, the adjusted R2 decreases 
slightly from 13.4% to 12.2%. The industry-based advantage remains not significant, while 
the return difference continues to be highly significant. When taking beta risk into considera-
tion, the major change is found in the risk difference. It becomes the most important factor for 
explaining superior stock market performance and is highly significant. When focusing on 
competitive advantage measured over five years, the ratio of resource-based to industry-based 
strategic advantage is 4.1, as compared to 3.6 in Panel B of Table 8.32 The difference in the 
resources-to-industry ratio is not significant. Again, the risk difference is found to be larger 
when taking beta risk into consideration, since it accounts for 50.8% of the resource-based 
advantage, as compared to 31.6% in Panel B of Table 8. To have access to favorable funding 
is thus an important element for firms in order to create superior stock market performance. A 
strategic reduction of the firm's risk premium relative to its industry thus deserves attention as 
a potential source of competitive advantage. 
The second robustness test is to examine whether our results depend on the specification 
of industries. A potential critique in our case is that a categorization of firms into only 11 in-
dustries may drive the result of a less important industry-based advantage relative to the re-
source-based advantage. We therefore expand the number of industries from 11 to 23. If we 
                                                 
32 The variance-based ratio of resources-to-industry is estimated to be 9.3, as compared to 7.7 with only size and 
book-to-price adjusted abnormal returns. Thus, the tendency of an increased importance of resources relative to 
industry is strengthened by our variance decomposition. 
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observe an increase in the industry-based advantage, support for this critique has been found. 
We are able to perform this test only over the last ten years, for which we have a full set of 
firm data categorized according to two separate industry specifications, the older one used 
exclusively by the OSE until the late 1990s and the international industry classification now 
officially adopted by the OSE; see footnote 17 and 18. Table 11 presents the results when the 
required rate of return on equity is adjusted for systematic risk, as well as for the two proxy 
risk factors. The results of Table 11 should thus be compared with those of Table 10. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE - 
 
When accumulating competitive advantage and abnormal return over one year, the re-
gression coefficient of the industry-based competitive advantage, termed 1 in (4), is 0.066 
with a categorization of firms into 11 industries and 0.070 with a categorization into 23 indus-
tries. Neither the individual coefficient estimates nor their differences are significant. This is 
true also for accumulations over three or five years. Based on the five-year regression, the 
ratio of resource-based to industry-based competitive advantage is 3.7, as compared to 4.1 in 
Table 10.33 Furthermore, the difference in the resources-to-industry ratio is also not signifi-
cant. This leads to the conclusion that our initial result of the dominance of the resource-based 
over the industry-based advantage is robust against this finer specification of industries, at 
least for specifications that are tractable with market data. 
Our next robustness test is to analyze the impact of having removed 1% of the highest 
and lowest annual observations of the measured competitive advantage and its three sources 
(Hawawini et al., 2003 and 2005; McNamara et al., 2005); see Table 1. Table 12 reports the 
results over the last ten years of our sample period with no removal of the 1% biggest strateg-
                                                 
33 The variance-based ratio of resources-to-industry is estimated at 7.3, compared with 9.3 when industry is clas-
sified into 11 industries. Thus, variance decomposition suggests that finer specifications of industry improve the 
importance of industry. However, the main result that resources dominate industry is confirmed. 
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ic leaders and losers, after utilizing a three-factor risk-adjustment of the required rate of return 
on equity. Thus, the results of Table 12 should be compared with those of Table 10 and 11. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE - 
 
First, we observe that the effect of removing observations is small and highest for the 
one-year horizon. Using an industry specification of 11 industries, Panel A of Table 12 re-
veals that the adjusted R2 is in fact higher using the full sample than using the sample without 
extreme observations from Table 9, although the increase of 1.2 percentage points is not sig-
nificant. Second, with an industry specification of 23 industries, Panel B of Table 12, as com-
pared to Table 10, yields the same finding. However, the increase in adjusted R2 of 4.5 per-
centage points is statistically significant. We may conclude that the dominance of the firm-
specific resource effect is strong, even when the effect of strategic leaders and losers is com-
pletely accounted for. 
Our next test is to make the regressions (3) and (4) even more robust by including ex-
treme observations. In addition to removing the 1% upper and 1% lower observations (see 
also Table 1), the regression coefficients will be produced by given higher weights to  'well-
behaving' observations from a statistical point of view.34 Table 13 reports the results for both 
industry specifications. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Evaluated over a five-year period, the industry-based component accounts for 29.1%, 
the return difference for 33.1% and the risk difference for 37.8% of total competitive advan-
                                                 
34 We have performed an initial screening based on Cook's distances larger than one to eliminate gross outliers 
before calculating starting values and then perform Huber iterations followed by biweight iterations as suggested 
by Li (1985). 
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tage. The ratio of resources-to-industry is estimated at 2.4. Using OLS-coefficients like in 
Table 10 and 11, this ratio is 3.9 on average, which is a significant increase. Estimation of 
robust coefficients as well as robust standard deviations leads to higher industry-based coeffi-
cients and to lower resource-based coefficients, with increased statistical significance. This 
effect of robust estimation also shows up in the one-year data. As before, the resource-based 
competitive advantage dominates. 
To sum up our stability and robustness tests; our pooled OLS regression results seem to 
be stable over time, at least for the last ten years, and robust against changes in test methodol-
ogy, including improvements in how the required rate of return is computed, expansion in the 
number of industries and altering the influence of extreme observations. The robustness tests 
underscore that both favorable risk differences from financial funding and favorable return 
differences from firm's assets are important sources for resource-based competitive advan-
tage. 
 
Panel Data – Fixed, Random or Mixed Effects across Firms 
Until now, the regression models (3) and (4) have been analyzed by pooled OLS regressions 
using robust standard deviations. Since we have a sample consisting of panel or longitudinal 
data, with cross-sectional observations over time, unobserved effects should also be consi-
dered (Greene, 2007; Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, we shall now run tests for unobserved 
firm effects to learn whether these effects are fixed or random. In turn, we shall perform the 
type of regressions suggested by the tests, and discuss how the unobserved effects may affect 
the results relative to the pooled OLS results of the two previous subsections. 
To determine whether unobserved firm effects do exist, we perform tests for both fixed 
and random effects. To test the hypothesis that the intercept terms are all equal across firms, 
we use the F-test described by Greene (2007, p. 197). The F-value is 5.20 over five years of 
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performance, i.e. the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the hypothesis of significant firm-
specific intercept terms. To test the hypothesis of no firm-specific error terms, we use the La-
grange multiplier test described by Greene (2007, pp. 205-208). The LM-value is 361.86, im-
plying that the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the hypothesis of significant firm-
specific error terms. We conclude that there are both fixed and random effects, suggesting a 
mixed model.35 However, if either a fixed or a random model should be chosen, Hausman's 
specification test points at the fixed effects model with firm-specific intercepts, as the value of 
this test statistic is 14.72 (Greene, 2007, pp. 208-209). 
Table 14 reports the results from running a fixed effects model and a mixed model with 
both fixed and random effects.  
 
- INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE - 
 
Panel A shows the results with firm-specific intercepts for data over the twenty-years 
1986-2005. These results should be compared with the results from accumulating perfor-
mance over one, three and five years in Panel A of Table 6. It turns out that the coefficients 
are smaller when estimated by the FE-model than by the pooled OLS-model, and the coeffi-
cient of the risk difference is not significant, irrespective of measurement length. As for the 
OLS-regression, the return difference is significant for all years of measurement, while the 
industry-based competitive advantage is only significant for three and five years. The ratio of 
resource-based to industry-based competitive advantage is 3.0 with five years of accumulating 
performance, as compared to 3.7 with pooled OLS. Thus, the resource-based advantage is 
slightly less dominant in the FE-model. 
                                                 
35 Performing a conservative likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis of no mixed effects yields a chi-squared test 
statistic of 757.72. This means that the pooled OLS regression model should be rejected in favor of the mixed 
effects regression model. 
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Panel B yields the results of the mixed model. It is assumed to have a fixed structure 
over all observations and random effects across firms, both in terms of the intercept and other 
coefficient estimates.36 Nevertheless, the results are very similar, which is also the case for the 
pure FE-model and the pooled OLS-model in Panel A of Table 6. With five years of accumu-
lating performance, the ratio of resource-based to industry-based competitive advantage is 
4.1, as compared to 3.0 in the FE-model and 3.7 in the pooled OLS-model.37 The major in-
sight provided by the mixed firm effects model relative to the pooled OLS-model is that it, 
along with the firm-specific intercept model of Panel A, questions the significance of the risk 
difference. 
An interesting question is whether the lack of significance of the risk difference is 
caused by not taking systematic beta risk into consideration when estimating the required re-
turn on equity, a question also analyzed with pooled OLS. We use the sub-period 1996-2005, 
for which we have beta-adjusted variables, to examine whether the significance of the risk 
difference is higher with more rigorous risk measurement. Table 15 reports the findings of the 
mixed model. 
 
- INSERT TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE - 
                                                 
36 The mixed model is ARti = ( + i) + ( + i) CAti + ti, where ARti is the dependent variable over t times and 
i firms,  is the overall intercept, i is the firm-specific intercept for firm i,  is the overall slope coefficient, i is 
the firm-specific slope, CAti is a vector of explanatory variables, and ti is the error term; see e.g. Greene (2007, 
pp. 223-224). Accordingly,  and  represent the fixed effects over all firms and i and i represent the random 
firm effects. The coefficients i and i are assumed to be correlated with an unstructured covariance matrix, 
which therefore has to be estimated along with the other parameters. The mixed model is estimated by the 
xtmixed - command in Stata, which has the structure: xtmixed AR CAIB REDRB RIDRB || Firmid: CAIB REDRB 
RIDRB, cov(unstructured); see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005). 
37 We have also analyzed an even more general mixed effects model with unobserved and nested time (t), indus-
try (j) and firm (i) effects, all with an unstructured covariance matrix between groups: ARtji = ( + t + j + i) + 
( + t + j + i) CAtji + tji. This model yields a CAIB-coefficient of 0.444 (with t-value = 5.47), a REDRB-
coefficient of 0.730 (13.28) and a RIDRB-coefficient of 0.546 (6.15), and thus the ratio of resources-to-industry is 
2.9. If the mixed effects model is nested only by industry and firm, the CAIB-coefficient is 0.240 (1.73), the 
REDRB-coefficient is 0.713 (8.09) and the RIDRB-coefficient is 0.158 (1.37), implying a ratio of resources-to-
industry of 3.6. The ratio of 2.9 relative to 3.6 suggests that there is a tendency of underestimating the industry 
effect if time effects are not taken explicitly into consideration. The industry effect is more important in the first 
ten years of our sample period, a period of less weight due to fewer observations; compare our discussion of time 
stability within the pooled OLS framework. 
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Panel A reports that the risk difference increases its importance when beta is taken into 
consideration, which also was true when we compared Panel B of Table 8 with Panel B of 
Table 10. The mixed effects model yields a ratio of resources-to-industry of 15.7, while the 
pooled OLS-model produces a ratio of 4.1. Thus, the mixed model with unobserved firm ef-
fects questions the significance of the industry-based competitive advantage even more than 
the pooled OLS model. Panel B reports the corresponding results with a finer industry-
classification; see Table 11 for corresponding OLS results. The results are replicated, al-
though the industry-based competitive advantage is slightly more significant. The ratio of 
resources-to-industry is now estimated at 7.4. 
Although statistical tests reject the hypothesis of no unobserved firm effects, we have 
found that the results obtained by the fixed effects and the mixed effects models correspond 
closely to those obtained by pooled OLS regression. That also explains why we have chosen 
to carry out traditional pooled OLS regressions in the two previous subsections. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study estimates the relative importance of industry-based and resource-based competitive 
advantage. We introduce an intuitive, simple and powerful decomposition of competitive ad-
vantage into its underlying sources and focus on these sources' ability to explain superior 
stock market performance. With this new approach, we find that firm-specific factors are 
about 3-4 times more important than industry-specific factors. Although the ratio of firm-
specific factors to industry-specific factors varies, depending on whether a short- or a long-
term measurement horizon is utilized, the dominance of the resource-based competitive ad-
vantage seems to be both stable over time and robust against altering the test specification. 
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Thus, our results give support to the findings of Rumelt (1991), and to most of the subsequent 
studies on accounting-based firm performance. 
A unique contribution of this study is to decompose the resource-based competitive ad-
vantage into a return and a risk difference, taking into consideration the relationship between 
risk and return. We have learned that the risk difference is very important when evaluating 
competitive advantage, as it accounts for 39% of the total resource-based advantage. This 
finding clearly demonstrates the importance for firms of obtaining favorable funding. 
In our study, we have focused on the output of having a competitive advantage, i.e. 
creating a return on equity that exceeds the required cost of capital, and we have analyzed the 
impact of competitive advantages on superior stock market performance, i.e. creating a stock 
market return that exceeds the required cost of capital, as suggested in the value-based man-
agement literature. A potential for future research would be to analyze underlying drivers of 
competitive advantage and identify how they influence abnormal stock market performance. 
For instance, is the industry-based competitive advantage related to the number of competitors 
or other measures of concentration in that industry, e.g. the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index? Is 
the return difference related to particular assets like intangibles, e.g. human resources? Is the 
risk difference related to ownership, e.g. foreign versus domestic investors, institutional ver-
sus private investors in a firm or corporate governance issues? Multiple regression analyses of 
abnormal stock market performance on these and additional strategy drivers would be an ap-
propriate approach to reveal which fundamental factors are the most important ones for supe-
rior stock market performance. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Sample 
   
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
Percentage
     
 All estimates of the required rate of return 1986-2005  3,762 
    
- Lacking accounting data to compute return on equity  468 
    
= All firm-year observations with complete data  3,284 100.0%
    
 - 1% highest and lowest of CA, CAIB, REDRB and RIDRB  233 7.1%
    
= Sample  3,051 92.9%
   
CA is the competitive advantage, CAIB is the industry-based competitive advantage, REDRB is the return differ-
ence, and RIDRB is the risk difference relative to industry. The resource-based strategic advantage CARB = 
REDRB + RIDRB, as suggested by (2). 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
  
Obs. 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
St. dev. 
 
 
Q1 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Q3 
 
       
AR 3,762 0.000 0.572 -0.256 0.032 0.289 
       
AR 3,284 0.003 0.562 -0.254 0.034 0.287 
CA 3,284 0.039 0.644 -0.252 0.020 0.315 
CAIB 3,284 0.041 0.358 -0.223 0.073 0.264 
REDRB 3,284 0.000 0.512 -0.113 0.008 0.121 
RIDRB 3,284 -0.002 0.185 -0.106 0.001 0.107 
       
AR 3,051 0.012 0.532 -0.246 0.034 0.277 
CA 3,051 0.040 0.407 -0.234 0.020 0.294 
CAIB 3,051 0.041 0.312 -0.223 0.070 0.254 
REDRB 3,051 -0.001 0.249 -0.101 0.010 0.117 
RIDRB 3,051 -0.000 0.154 -0.104 0.001 0.104 
       
AR is abnormal stock market return, CA is the competitive advantage, CAIB is the industry-based competitive 
advantage, REDRB is the return difference, and RIDRB is the risk difference relative to industry. The resource-
based strategic advantage CARB = REDRB + RIDRB. St. dev. is short for standard deviation, Q1 is lower quartile, 
and Q3 is upper quartile. 
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Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
      
 
Panel A 
1 Year of Accumulating Performance 
 
 
 
Obs. 
 
 
AR 
 
 
CA 
 
 
CAIB 
 
 
REDRB 
 
      
CA 3,051 0.219***    
CAIB 3,051 0.019 0.724***   
REDRB 3,051 0.311*** 0.543*** -0.047***  
RIDRB 3,051 0.037* 0.295*** -0.040* 0.088*** 
      
 
Panel B 
3 Years of Accumulating Performance 
 
 
 
Obs. 
 
 
AR 
 
 
CA 
 
 
CAIB 
 
 
REDRB 
 
      
CA 2,340 0.365***    
CAIB 2,340 0.070*** 0.536***   
REDRB 2,340 0.375*** 0.697*** -0.098***  
RIDRB 2.340 0.071*** 0.316*** -0.008 -0.079*** 
      
 
Panel C 
5 Years of Accumulating Performance 
 
 
 
Obs. 
 
 
AR 
 
 
CA 
 
 
CAIB 
 
 
REDRB 
 
      
CA 1,802 0.499***    
CAIB 1,802 0.107*** 0.431***   
REDRB 1,802 0.448*** 0.731*** -0.150***  
RIDRB 1,802 0.150*** 0.345*** -0.014 -0.066*** 
      
AR is abnormal stock market return, CA is the competitive advantage, CAIB is the industry-based competitive 
advantage, REDRB is the return difference, and RIDRB is the risk difference relative to industry. The resource-
based strategic advantage CARB = REDRB + RIDRB. Obs. is short for number of observations. The asterisks ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 2.5%- and 5%-level, respectively, when tested two-sided. 
Notice that the number of observations falls when accumulating competitive advantage and abnormal stock mar-
ket performance over more years. To limit this effect, observations from 1985, 1984 and so forth are utilized 
successively. E.g. when accumulating over five years, data from 1981-2005 are included in the sample to obtain 
1,802 firm-year observations. 
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Table 4 
Current Competitive Advantage and Current Abnormal Stock Market Performance – 
1 Year of Accumulation 
 
 Coefficients  
 
t- or F-value 
 
   
Intercept 0.000  0.02 
CA 0.286 *** 10.10 
Adj. R2 0.048 *** 4.28 
F-value 101.97 ***  
Obs. 3,051   
   
Intercept 0.010  1.08 
CAIB 0.062  1.91 
REDRB 0.680 *** 11.97 
RIDRB 0.229 *** 3.17 
Adj. R2 0.101 *** 9.12 
F-value 53.63 ***  
Obs. 3,051   
   
Ratio of Resources-to-Industry 14.639 *** 93.68 
   
The first regression model is given by (3), and the second is given by (4). The t-values of the regression coeffi-
cients are based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted estimates of the standard deviations; see White (1980). Having a 
large sample of 3,051 observations, we utilize the HC1-estimator; see MacKinnon and White (1985). Since the 
3,051 firm-year include 504 firms over 1 to 20 years, some clustering over time may be present; see Rogers 
(1993). The cluster-adjusted t-values are 1.47 for CAIB, 11.95 for REDRB and 3.17 for RIDRB. Since the effect of 
clustering seems to be small, we choose to report only White-adjusted t-values, i.e. t-values robust against possi-
ble heteroskedasticity, except for Panel A of Table 14, where the possibility of clustering has been dealt with. 
The t-value of the adjusted R2 is based on the standard deviation found in Cramer (1987). The variance inflation 
factors are 1.01 for CAIB, 1.01 for REDRB and 1.00 for RIDRB. The mean of 1.01 implies that multicollinearity 
does not cause significant problems. The test for the null hypothesis that (2 + 3)/1 = 1 is performed as a linear 
Wald test 2 + 3 = 1. 
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Table 5 
Current Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance – 
1 Year of Accumulation
   
Panel A Next Period's Abnormal Return Coefficients t- or F-value 
  
Intercept 0.001 0.07 
CA 0.109 *** 4.20 
Adj. R2 0.006 0.49 
F-value 17.65 ***  
Obs. 2,747  
  
Intercept 0.006 0.60 
CAIB -0.006 -0.21 
REDRB 0.378 *** 6.36 
RIDRB -0.086 -1.27 
Adj. R2 0.027 ** 2.32 
F-value 14.04 ***  
Obs. 2,747  
  
Ratio of Resources-to-Industry -46.081 *** 10.07 
  
Panel B Current and Next Period's Abnormal Return Coefficients t- or F-value 
  
Intercept -0.001 -0.07 
CA 0.411 *** 10.50 
Adj. R2 0.043 *** 3.64 
F-value 110.17 ***  
Obs. 2,747  
  
Intercept 0.016 1.11 
CAIB 0.063 1.43 
REDRB 1.101 *** 12.22 
RIDRB 0.175 1.65 
Adj. R2 0.110 *** 9.36 
F-value 53.68 ***  
Obs. 2,747  
  
Ratio of Resources-to-Industry 20.337 *** 78.41 
  
Panel C Current and Next Period's Abnormal Return Coefficients t-value 
  
Intercept -0.024 -1,51 
i 1.135 *** 12.91 
k -0.121 *** -2.91 
Adj. R2 0.128 *** 11.11 
F-value 86.88 ***  
Obs. 2,747  
  
Intercept -0.017 -1.04 
i 1.167 *** 12.60 
k -0.165 -1.57 
iI -0.215 -1.78 
kI 0.080 0.76 
Adj. R2 0.129 *** 11.10 
F-value 44.14 ***  
Obs. 2,747  
  
The number of observations is reduced from 3,051 to 2,747 due to lacking observations of abnormal return in the 
following year. There is, for instance, no return for 2006 since these were not readily available in the database at 
the time when data were collected. The variance inflation factors of Panel B are 1.01 for CAIB, 1.01 for REDRB 
and 1.00 for RIDRB, suggesting insignificant multicollinearity problems. The variance inflation factors of the last 
regression in Panel C are 6.03 for i, 5.81 for k and 1.37 for iI and 1.17 for kI. The average vif is 3.60. 
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Table 6 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance – 
Accumulation of Different Length 
           
Panel A 
Accumulation of Performance over 1-5 years 
 
Years of Accumulation 
1  2  3  4  5  
      
Intercept -0.001  0.022 0.013 0.005 0.029  
CA 0.411 *** 0.416 *** 0.519 *** 0.598 *** 0.556 ***
Adj. R2 0.043 *** 0.078 *** 0.151 *** 0.217 *** 0.205 ***
F-value 110.17 *** 112.42 *** 144.08 *** 181.67 *** 186.68 ***
Obs. 2,747  2,417 2,119 1,848 1,607  
       
Intercept 0.016  0.050 *** 0.047 * 0.037 0.079 **
CAIB 0.063  0.095 * 0.288 *** 0.415 *** 0.306 ***
REDRB 1.101 *** 0.754 *** 0.669 *** 0.704 *** 0.690 ***
RIDRB 0.175  0.164 * 0.317 *** 0.420 *** 0.438 ***
Adj. R2 0.110 *** 0.136 *** 0.175 *** 0.232 *** 0.231 ***
F-value 53.68 *** 20.69 *** 36.99 *** 54.87 *** 55.93 ***
Obs. 2,747  2,471 2,119 1,848 1,607  
       
Ratio 20.337 *** 9.685 *** 3.427 *** 2.711 *** 3.683 *** 
           
Panel B 
Accumulation of Performance over 6-10 years 
 
Years of Accumulation 
6  7  8  9  10  
      
Intercept 0.117 ** 0.147 *** 0.240 *** 0.330 *** 0.369 ***
CA 0.460 *** 0.503 *** 0.514 *** 0.575 *** 0.596 ***
Adj. R2 0.171 *** 0.218 *** 0.233 *** 0.268 *** 0.277 ***
F-value 23.97 *** 32.07 *** 32.68 *** 133.99 *** 123.65 ***
Obs. 1,397  1,224 1,064 929 832  
      
Intercept 0.167 *** 0.208 *** 0.308 *** 0.391 *** 0.426 ***
CAIB 0.270 *** 0.321 *** 0.297 *** 0.304 *** 0.365 ***
REDRB 0.507 *** 0.529 *** 0.536 *** 0.630 *** 0.613 ***
RIDRB 0.489 *** 0.606 *** 0.706 *** 0.735 *** 0.768 ***
Adj. R2 0.180 *** 0.223 *** 0.251 *** 0.297 *** 0.296 ***
F-value 20.07 *** 33.59 *** 44.99 *** 59.63 *** 59.53 ***
Obs. 1,397  1,224 1,064 929 832  
      
Ratio 3.695 *** 3.540 *** 4.178 *** 4.485 *** 3.783 *** 
      
This table is based on 2,747 observations from the period 1986-2005; see Table 5. When accumulating the com-
petitive advantage and the abnormal stock market return over several years, additional years are added to the 
sample, implying that the data for the 10-year accumulation are from the period 1976-2005. The variance infla-
tion factors with five years of accumulating performance are 1.03 for CAIB, 1.03 for REDRB and 1.01 for RIDRB, 
with an average of 1.02. There are no significant multicollinearity problems. 
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Table 7 
Stability Tests –  
Competitive Advantage Versus Competitive Disadvantage 
           
 
Panel A 
Competitive Advantage 1986-2005 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
            
Intercept -0.006  -0.195  0.077 ** 1.987  0.051  0.888 
CA 0.449 *** 7.009  0.457 *** 9.941  0.522 *** 10.347 
Adj. R2 0.027 *** 3.251  0.106 *** 6.299  0.155 *** 7.177 
F-value 49.128 ***   98.825 ***   107.058 ***  
Obs. 1,504    1,143    880   
            
Intercept 0.023  0.796  0.117 *** 3.295  0.120 ** 2.185 
CAIB 0.192 *** 2.757  0.226 *** 3.741  0.290 *** 4.443 
REDRB 0.824 *** 7.452  0.602 *** 8.554  0.647 *** 9.674 
RIDRB 0.432 *** 3.342  0.408 *** 4.013  0.459 *** 4.350 
Adj. R2 0.052 *** 4.639  0.128 *** 7.058  0.179 *** 7.953 
F-value 20.885 ***   31.784 ***   35.840 ***  
Obs. 1,504    1,143    880   
            
Ratio 6.532 *** 41.91  4.479 *** 36.71  3.819 *** 36.30 
            
 
Panel B 
Competitive Disadvantage 1986-2005 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
            
Intercept -0.066 * -1.707  -0.027  -0.840  0.032  0.770 
CA 0.227 * 1.944  0.542 *** 6.730  0.592 *** 7.418 
Adj. R2 0.003  0.782  0.154 *** 7.537  0.219 *** 8.549 
F-value 3.780 *   45.288 ***   55.031 ***  
Obs. 1,243    976    727   
            
Intercept -0.103 *** -2.635  -0.006  -0.176  0.055  1.361 
CAIB -0.398 *** -2.914  0.318 *** 3.334  0.285 *** 2.657 
REDRB 1.099 *** 6.973  0.695 *** 5.546  0.718 *** 6.874 
RIDRB -0.381 ** -2.013  0.165  1.571  0.398 *** 3.686 
Adj. R2 0.137 *** 7.783  0.185 *** 8.613  0.249 *** 9.519 
F-value 27.565 ***   10.514 ***   18.188 ***  
Obs. 1,243    976    727   
            
Ratio -1.805 *** 26.46  2.709 *** 12.01  3.923 *** 29.77 
            
Tests for Differences between Advantage and Disadvantage 
            
 Adj. R2 -0.085 *** -4.053  -0.058 ** -2.061  -0.070 ** -2.024 
F-value 6.79 ***   2.32    0.34   
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Table 8 
Stability Tests –  
Specification on Different Time Periods Within 1986-2005 
           
 
Panel A 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance 1986-1995 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept 0.009  0.41  0.118 *** 3.44 0.136 *** 2.95
CA 0.395 *** 5.92  0.456 *** 8.35 0.715 *** 12.98
Adj. R2 0.039 * 2.05  0.101 *** 4.52 0.236 *** 9.12
F-value 35.07 ***   69.69 *** 168.43 *** 
Obs. 1,031    753 561  
       
Intercept 0.022  1.00  0.104 *** 3.02 0.133 ** 2.55
CAIB 0.166 * 2.04  0.306 *** 4.12 0.575 *** 5.55
REDRB 0.784 *** 5.82  0.686 *** 8.74 0.798 *** 10.89
RIDRB 0.232  1.57  0.270 *** 3.04 0.618 *** 6.33
Adj. R2 0.063 *** 3.30  0.134 *** 5.99 0.245 *** 9.43
F-value 13.88 ***   29.09 *** 53.99 *** 
Obs. 1,031    753 561  
       
Ratio 6.117 *** 15.73  3.123 *** 30.36 2.462 *** 35.78
       
 
Panel B 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance 1996-2005 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept -0.007  -0.33  -0.058 -1.62 -0.037  -0.84
CA 0.418 *** 8.69  0.564 *** 9.38 0.526 *** 11.02
Adj. R2 0.043 *** 2.94  0.181 *** 10.89 0.205 *** 10.81
F-value 75.52 ***   87.96 *** 121.46 *** 
Obs. 1,716    1,366 1,046  
       
Intercept 0.011  0.55  0.003 0.11 0.038  0.99
CAIB 0.024  0.47  0.330 *** 4.72 0.272 *** 4.66
REDRB 1.253 *** 10.85  0.667 *** 7.56 0.676 *** 9.35
RIDRB 0.149  1.02  0.376 *** 3.56 0.312 *** 3.15
Adj. R2 0.134 *** 9.08  0.194 *** 11.70 0.235 *** 12.35
F-value 40.92 ***   25.16 *** 36.04 *** 
Obs. 1,716    1,366 1,046  
       
Ratio 57.930 *** 58.66  3.165 *** 23.53 3.632 *** 28.10
       
Tests for Differences between 1986-1995 and 1996-2005 
            
 Adj. R2  0.071 *** 2.95   0.060 * 2.15  -0.010  -0.33 
F-value 2.17    1.64    4.99 ***  
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Table 9 
Stability Tests – 
Specification on Different Time Periods Within 1996-2005 
           
 
Panel A 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance 1996-2000 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept -0.021  -0.84  -0.055 -1.54 0.103 ** 2.35
CA 0.414 *** 6.22  0.526 *** 9.89 0.397 *** 6.74
Adj. R2 0.045 ** 2.33  0.168 *** 7.39 0.140 *** 5.09
F-value 38.72 ***   97.82 *** 61.45 *** 
Obs. 989    732 502  
       
Intercept 0.004  0.19  -0.014 -0.39 0.087 * 2.03
CAIB 0.020  0.31  0.327 *** 3.50 0.212 *** 2.68
REDRB 1.156 *** 8.39  0.634 *** 10.30 0.606 *** 7.67
RIDRB 0.262  1.56  0.249 * 2.10 0.139  1.41
Adj. R2 0.133 *** 6.81  0.185 *** 8.14 0.180 *** 6.55
F-value 24.30 ***   37.68 *** 22.17 *** 
Obs. 989    732 502  
       
Ratio 72.316 *** 40.79  2.703 *** 12.02 3.509 *** 12.38
       
 
Panel B 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance 2001-2005 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept 0.012  0.32  -0.061 -0.91 -0.270 *** -3.09
CA 0.419 *** 6.10  0.587 *** 6.01 0.670 *** 8.04
Adj. R2 0.040  1.78  0.183 *** 7.50 0.259 *** 9.84
F-value 37.18 ***   36.14 *** 64.69 *** 
Obs. 727    634 544  
       
Intercept 0.017  0.49  0.029 0.51 -0.111  -1.43
CAIB 0.023  0.29  0.317 *** 3.29 0.428 *** 4.47
REDRB 1.363 *** 7.08  0.684 *** 4.75 0.726 *** 7.10
RIDRB 0.059  0.27  0.522 *** 2.89 0.629 *** 3.53
Adj. R2 0.134 *** 5.88  0.194 *** 7.94 0.265 *** 10.04
F-value 18.54 ***   11.44 *** 21.52 *** 
Obs. 727    634 544  
       
Ratio 61.214 *** 26.30  3.807 *** 15.36 3.169 *** 16.38
       
Tests for Differences between 1996-2000 and 2001-2005 
            
 Adj. R2 0.001  0.04  0.009  0.27  0.085 * 2.23 
F-value 0.47    0.56    2.58 *  
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Table 10 
Robustness Tests –  
Abnormal Returns Adjusted for Systematic Risk 1996-2005 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Adjusted for Systematic Risk 
 
  
Obs. 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
St. dev. 
 
 
Q1 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Q3 
 
       
AR 1,752 0.002 0.461 -0.187 0.004 0.197 
CA 1,752 0.031 0.514 -0.267 0.028 0.332 
CAIB 1,752 0.059 0.375 -0.225 0.028 0.303 
REDRB 1,752 -0.010 0.298 -0.107 0.010 0.132 
RIDRB 1,752 -0.019 0.347 -0.196 -0.015 0.155 
            
 
Panel B 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance 1996-2005 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
            
Intercept -0.025  -1.61  -0.142 *** -5.66  -0.181 *** -5.24 
CA 0.347 *** 9.59  0.434 *** 8.83  0.323 *** 8.39 
Adj. R2 0.070 *** 4.76  0.230 *** 12.71  0.175 *** 7.42 
F-value 91.90 ***   77.89 ***   70.43 ***  
Obs. 1,752    1,151    681   
            
Intercept -0.000  -0.03  -0.050  -1.76  -0.085 ** -2.26 
CAIB 0.066  1.50  0.223 *** 3.68  0.174 *** 2.96 
REDRB 0.574 *** 7.20  0.387 *** 5.85  0.354 *** 6.24 
RIDRB 0.655 *** 10.84  0.536 *** 10.24  0.366 *** 7.89 
Adj. R2 0.122 *** 8.31  0.257 *** 14.17  0.184 *** 7.81 
F-value 50.53 ***   35.78 ***   22.24 ***  
Obs. 1,752    1,151    681   
            
Ratio 18.619 *** 104.19  4.134 *** 39.20  4.131 *** 27.29 
            
Tests for Differences in Adjusted R2 Relative to Table 8, Panel B 
            
 Adj. R2 -0.013  -0.61  0.062 ** 2.53  -0.051  -1.67 
            
Abnormal stock market return, AR, is calculated relative to the standard market model, using a 36-month return 
history prior to measuring abnormal return. The beta-adjusted excess return is also adjusted on the cross-section 
of firms for firm size and book-to-price effects; see Fama and French (1992 and 1993). Notice that the estimated 
competitive advantage and its underlying sources are also changed, due to the change in the required rate of 
return. 
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Table 11 
Robustness Tests –  
Different Industry Specification 1996-2005 
 
 
 
Panel A 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample with 23 Industries 
 
  
Obs. 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
St. dev. 
 
 
Q1 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Q3 
 
       
AR 1,704 0.017 0.433 -0.177 0.006 0.203 
CA 1,704 0.061 0.472 -0.247 0.037 0.345 
CAIB 1,704 0.069 0.381 -0.224 0.003 0.315 
REDRB 1,704 0.003 0.242 -0.104 0.010 0.130 
RIDRB 1,704 -0.010 0.311 -0.181 -0.009 0.141 
            
 
Panel B 
Competitive Advantage and Abnormal Stock Market Performance 1996-2005 
 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
            
Intercept -0.012  -0.78  -0.118 *** -4.69  -0.147 *** -4.36 
CA 0.289 *** 7.82  0.409 *** 8.05  0.301 *** 7.91 
Adj. R2 0.044 *** 2.97  0.207 *** 11.35  0.158 *** 6.66 
F-value 61.12 ***   64.78 ***   62.60 ***  
Obs. 1,704    1,125    665   
            
Intercept 0.006  0.40  -0.036  -1.34  -0.069 * -1.99 
CAIB 0.070  1.66  0.230 *** 4.53  0.183 *** 3.55 
REDRB 0.581 *** 6.36  0.363 *** 4.99  0.324 *** 5.22 
RIDRB 0.651 *** 9.29  0.523 *** 9.28  0.354 *** 7.50 
Adj. R2 0.091 *** 6.12  0.235 *** 12.81  0.167 *** 6.98 
F-value 36.50 ***   31.16 ***   20.89 ***  
Obs. 1,704    1,125    665   
            
Ratio 17.585 *** 79.41  3.854 *** 30.71  3.712 *** 19.80 
            
Tests for Differences Adjusted R2 Relative to Table 10, Panel B 
            
 Adj. R2 -0.031  -1.48  -0.022  -0.85  -0.017  -0.52 
            
The industries are 1) energy, 2) materials, 3) industrials – capital goods, 4) industrials – commercial services and 
supplies, 5) industrials – transportation, 6) consumer discretionary – automobiles and components, 7) consumer 
discretionary – consumer durables and apparel, 8) consumer discretionary – hotels, restaurants and leisure, 9) 
consumer discretionary – media, 10) consumer discretionary – retailing, 11) consumer staples – food, beverage 
and tobacco, 12) health care – health care equipment and services, 13) health care – pharmaceuticals and biotech, 
14) financials – banks, 15) financial – savings banks (primary capital certificates), 16) financials – diversified 
financials, 17) insurance, 18) real estate, 19) information technology – semiconductors and semiconductor 
equipment, 20) information technology – software and services, 21) information technology – technology hard-
ware and equipment, 22) telecommunication services and 23) utilities. 
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Table 12 
Robustness Tests – 
No Removal of Extreme Observations 1996-2005 
 
            
 
Panel A 
Industry-Classification with 11 Industries 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept -0.018  -1.15  -0.139 *** -5.58 -0.179 *** -5.11
CA 0.310 *** 6.60  0.410 *** 8.66 0.294 *** 7.57
Adj. R2 0.079 *** 5.48  0.233 *** 13.08 0.155 *** 6.66
F-value 43.62 ***   75.01 *** 57.35 *** 
Obs. 1,820    1,184 692  
       
Intercept 0.001  0.04  -0.046 -1.60 -0.083 ** -2.20
CAIB 0.072  1.66  0.197 *** 3.17 0.145 ** 2.37
REDRB 0.283 *** 3.82  0.358 *** 5.85 0.326 *** 5.98
RIDRB 0.660 *** 8.67  0.509 *** 10.33 0.335 *** 7.06
Adj. R2 0.134 *** 9.32  0.261 *** 14.61 0.164 *** 7.03
F-value 26.64 ***   35.78 *** 18.17 *** 
Obs. 1,820    1,184 692  
       
Ratio 13.026 *** 57.44  4.406 *** 40.56 4.546 *** 25.68
       
Tests for Differences in Adjusted R2 Relative to Table 10, Panel B 
       
 Adj. R2 0.012  0.59  0.004 0.16 -0.020  -0.59
       
 
Panel B 
Industry-Classification with 23 Industries 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept -0.018  -1.15  -0.139 *** -5.58 -0.179 *** -5.11
CA 0.310 *** 6.60  0.410 *** 8.66 0.294 *** 7.57
Adj. R2 0.079 *** 5.48  0.233 *** 13.08 0.155 *** 6.66
F-value 43.62 ***   75.01 *** 57.35 *** 
Obs. 1,820    1,184 692  
       
Intercept 0.001  0.04  -0.057 * -2.13 -0.101 *** -2.89
CAIB 0.074  1.75  0.221 *** 4.17 0.169 *** 3.24
REDRB 0.310 *** 3.62  0.367 *** 5.50 0.334 *** 5.37
RIDRB 0.682 *** 8.07  0.516 *** 10.09 0.341 *** 6.79
Adj. R2 0.136 *** 9.48  0.259 *** 14.52 0.164 *** 6.99
F-value 22.71 ***   35.41 *** 17.22 *** 
Obs. 1,820    1,184 692  
       
Ratio 13.458 *** 44.23  3.990 *** 35.03 3.996 *** 20.33
       
Tests for Differences in Adjusted R2 Relative to Table 11, Panel B 
       
 Adj. R2 0.045 * 2.19  0.025 0.96 -0.003  -0.09
       
The required rate of return on equity, used to calculate abnormal stock market return r - k, the competitive ad-
vantage i - k and its three underlying sources, is adjusted for systematic risk and proxy risk factors in terms of 
firm size and book-to-price effects. The results of this table should therefore be compared with those of Table 10 
and 11, where the 1% highest and lowest observations of CA, CAIB, REDRB and RIDRB have been removed. 
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Table 13 
Robustness Tests –  
Removal and Less Weight on Statistically Extreme Observations 1996-2005 
            
 
Panel A 
Industry-Classification with 11 Industries
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept 0.010  0.08  -0.099 *** -5.47 -0.097 *** -3.52
CA 0.379 *** 16.89  0.449 *** 24.67 0.374 *** 17.74
Adj. R2 0.140 *** 9.54  0.346 *** 19.13 0.316 *** 13.43
F-value 285.24 ***   608.51 *** 314.82 *** 
Obs. 1,752    1,151 681  
       
Intercept 0.016  1.39  -0.040 -1.71 -0.057  -1.55
CAIB 0.236 *** 7.81  0.335 *** 8.07 0.320 *** 7.38
REDRB 0.418 *** 10.46  0.382 *** 15.45 0.371 *** 13.06
RIDRB 0.659 *** 19.12  0.514 *** 23.49 0.408 *** 15.96
Adj. R2 0.195 *** 13.32  0.351 *** 19.40 0.322 *** 13.65
F-value 142.58 ***   208.53 *** 108.63 *** 
Obs. 1,752    1,151 681  
       
Ratio 4.564 *** 162.54  2.677 *** 104.19 2.434 *** 55.74
       
Tests for Differences in Adjusted R2 Relative to Table 10, Panel B; see Table 12, Panel A 
       
 Adj. R2 0.073 *** 3.54  0.095 *** 3.70 0.138 *** 4.13
       
 
Panel B 
Industry-Classification with 23 Industries
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept 0.010  0.86  -0.090 *** -4.91 -0.085 *** -3.04
CA 0.338 *** 14.06  0.441 *** 23.41 0.366 *** 17.21
Adj. R2 0.103 *** 6.97  0.327 *** 17.91 0.308 *** 12.93
F-value 197.57 ***   548.00 *** 296.01 *** 
Obs. 1,704    1,125 665  
       
Intercept 0.023 * 2.06  -0.026 -1.18 -0.041  -1.17
CAIB 0.223 *** 7.66  0.315 *** 8.26 0.315 *** 7.78
REDRB 0.397 *** 8.04  0.398 *** 15.08 0.351 *** 11.64
RIDRB 0.665 *** 17.21  0.531 *** 22.79 0.418 *** 15.68
Adj. R2 0.164 *** 11.02  0.349 *** 19.07 0.320 *** 13.42
F-value 112.27 ***   202.05 *** 105.37 *** 
Obs. 1,704    1,125 665  
       
Ratio 4.766 *** 118.82  2.947 *** 124.67 2.441 *** 53.12
       
Tests for Differences in Adjusted R2 Relative to Table 11, Panel B; see Table 12, Panel B 
       
 Adj. R2 0.073 *** 3.47  0.115 *** 4.42 0.154 *** 4.56
       
In the Tables 4 - 12, the t-values have been made robust by utilizing of heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
deviations; see White (1980) and MacKinnon and White (1985). This implies, however, that the coefficients are 
based on OLS. In this table, also the coefficients are adjusted by giving less weight to observations identified as 
extreme from a statistical point of view by the robust regression procedure in the statistical program package 
Stata (i.e. the rreg - command). 
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Table 14 
Panel Data Models –  
Unobserved Effects Across Firms 1986-2005 
            
 
PANEL A 
Fixed Effects Model (Within) 
Standard Deviations Adjusted for Heteroskedasticity and Clustering 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value Coef.  t-value 
       
Intercept 0.010 *** 3.80  0.044 *** 3.47 0.090 *** 3.59
CA 0.229 *** 5.29  0.387 *** 7.31 0.406 *** 6.56
Overall R2 0.043    0.151 0.205  
F-value 27.97 ***   53.40 *** 43.04 *** 
Obs. 2,747    2,119 1,607  
Firms 435    343 270  
       
Intercept 0.184 *** 6.22  0.063 *** 4.02 0.103 *** 3.54
CAIB 0.041  0.77  0.219 *** 3.32 0.228 *** 3.09
REDRB 0.802 *** 7.96  0.574 *** 5.99 0.612 *** 6.07
RIDRB 0.023  0.21  0.044 0.45 0.061  0.53
Overall R2 0.110    0.170 0.216  
F-value 21.93 ***   12.92 *** 13.09 *** 
Obs. 2,747    2,119 1,607  
Firms 435    343 270  
       
Ratio 20.168 *** 27.52  2.821 *** 8.69 2.951 *** 6.80
       
 
PANEL B 
Mixed Effects Model 
Random Intercept and Coefficients Across Firms, Unstructured Covariance Matrix
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  
z-
value 
Coef.  
z-
value 
Coef.  z-value 
       
Intercept -0.030  -1.38  -0.038 -0,90 -0.028  -0.45
CA 0.346 *** 8.56  0.459 *** 11.07 0.470 *** 11.21
AIC 6,497.2    5,570.4 4,507.6  
Wald 2 73.35 ***   122.49 *** 125.57 *** 
Obs. 2,747    2,119 1,607  
Firms 435    343 270  
       
Intercept 0.021  1.26  0.057 1.66 0.084  1.54
CAIB 0.019  0.37  0.182 *** 3.18 0.217 *** 3.66
REDRB 0.992 *** 11.81  0.696 *** 11.12 0.724 *** 10.64
RIDRB 0.210 * 2.05  0.253 *** 2.60 0.164  1.63
AIC 6,081.0    5,222,4 4,163.2  
Wald 2 144.30 ***   138.68 *** 126.89 *** 
Obs. 2,747    2,119 1,607  
Firms 435    343 270  
       
Ratio 62.700 *** 69.98  5.207 *** 35.46 4.094 *** 24.99
       
The fixed effects model is performed by the help of Stata's xtreg-command: xtreg y x, fe robust cluster(firmid), 
suggesting standard deviation adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering; y is the dependent variable, x is a 
vector of explanatory variables and firmid is the indicator for firms. The mixed effect model is based on Stata's 
xtmixed-command: xtmixed y x || firmid: x, cov(unstructured); see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2005). AIC is 
Akaike Information Criterion, which is a fit statistic, penalized by the number of parameters. Smaller AIC 
represents better fits. 
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Table 15 
Mixed Effect Model 
Random Intercept and Coefficients with Unstructured Covariance Matrix 1996-2005 
            
 
PANEL A 
Industry-Classification with 11 Industries 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  z-value Coef.  z-value Coef.  z-value 
            
Intercept -0.019  -1.17  -0.112 *** -3.02  -0.160 *** -2.77 
CA 0.336 *** 8.66  0.386 *** 10.13  0.234 *** 6.58 
AIC 3,437.6    2,294.1    1,482.7   
Wald 2 74.99 ***   102.64 ***   43.33 ***  
Obs. 1,752    1,151    681   
Firms 336    260    187   
            
Intercept 0.007  0.47  0.004  0.11  -0.032  -0.65 
CAIB 0.061  1.18  0.076  1.51  0.043  0.82 
REDRB 0.534 *** 7.26  0.381 *** 6.36  0.310 *** 5.53 
RIDRB 0.709 *** 12.11  0.515 *** 11.02  0.369 *** 7.85 
AIC 3,203.6    2,132.0    1,401.8   
Wald 2 165.03 ***   128.11 ***   67.93 ***  
Obs. 1,752    1,151    681   
Firms 336    260    187   
            
Ratio 20.143 *** 105.03  11.786 *** 58.58  15.679 *** 34.26 
            
 
PANEL B 
Industry-Classification with 23 Industries 
 
1 year 
 
3 years 
 
5 years 
Coef.  z-value Coef.  z-value Coef.  z-value 
            
Intercept -0.008  -0.47  -0.109 *** -2.99  -0.138 *** -2.43 
CA 0.285 *** 7.12  0.385 *** 9.88  0.214 *** 6.07 
AIC 3,260.7    2,190.8    1,425.4   
Wald 2 50.74 ***   97.61 ***   36,82 ***  
Obs. 1,704    1,125    665   
Firms 332    259    185   
            
Intercept 0.015  0.97  0.004  0.11  -0.043  -0.92 
CAIB 0.097 * 2.04  0.120 *** 2.65  0.100 * 2.03 
REDRB 0.579 *** 6.38  0.415 *** 6.16  0.383 *** 5.53 
RIDRB 0.684 *** 11.21  0.515 *** 11.01  0.360 *** 7.28 
AIC 3.019.5    2,078.0    1,355.1   
Wald 2 140.44 ***   127.54 ***   59.03 ***  
Obs. 1,704    1,125    665   
Firms 332    259    185   
            
Ratio 12.964 *** 83.72  7.775 *** 55.21  7.432 *** 33.68 
            
 
 
